

A Discussion on H5N1 Avian Flu

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
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Learning Objectives

1. Understand updated information on H5N1 viruses, the epidemiology of human cases of H5N1, and the associated risk to humans.
2. Identify and access quality and up-to-date resources and guidance on H5N1, an evolving landscape.
3. Assess risk to individual patients and mitigate risk to healthcare providers and facilities through the implementation of the Identify, Isolate, Inform approach.

Overview of Human HPAI A(H5N1) Cases

- Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) virus first detected in a poultry outbreak in Scotland (1959)
 - Continue to evolve (classified into clades)
- First human infection identified in 1997 (Hong Kong)
 - 18 cases, 6 deaths
- 1997 to date: 912 human cases reported (24 countries)
 - >50% case fatality proportion
- Clade 2.3.4.4b viruses emerged in 2020 in wild birds
 - Detected in wild birds in N. America (end of 2021)
 - Poultry outbreaks, wild bird detections 2022 ongoing
 - Wide range of infected mammals
- Other virus clades are circulating among wild birds, poultry




H5N1 Cases Since 1997

2022-2024: 29 cases

(Australia 1, Cambodia 11, Chile 1, China 2, Ecuador 1, Spain 2, UK 5, US 4, Vietnam 2)

Epidemic Curve of Human Cases of A(H5N1) by Illness Onset Date, 1997-2024 by Country (N=912)



Human Infections with HPAI A(H5N1) Viruses

- HPAI A(H5N1) viruses bind preferentially to receptors most prevalent in the human lower respiratory tract
 - Also found on conjunctivae
- Wide symptomatic clinical spectrum
 - Mild (conjunctivitis, upper respiratory illness)
 - Severe/critical (pneumonia, respiratory failure, sepsis)
- Unprotected exposures resulting in human infection
 - Direct contact with sick/dead poultry
 - Visiting a live poultry market
 - Preparing poultry for consumption that were sick/died
 - Exposure to other infected animals (swans, dairy cows)
 - Limited, non-sustained transmission from prolonged exposure to a symptomatic H5N1 patient



T Uyeki NEJM 2024



37-yo woman, illness day #7
Admission CXR



Illness day #10; died day #11



21-yo male, illness day #5
Admission CXR



Illness day #12; survived
(not ventilated)

T Uyeki, CDC September 2005

H5N1 Human Cases in 2024, U.S.

- Three human cases with cattle exposure detected:
 - April 1 – Texas, farmworker, conjunctivitis
 - May 22 – Michigan, farmworker, conjunctivitis
 - May 30 – Michigan, farmworker, upper respiratory symptoms, watery eyes
- Not hospitalized, isolation recommended
- Antivirals recommended
- No human-to-human transmission
- Virus isolated from 2 cases



H5N1 Human Cases – Virus Sequences to Date

Diagnostics

- No impact to current CDC influenza diagnostic assay's ability to detect A(H5N1) viruses
- Public health laboratories have the CDC real-time RT-PCR A(H5) assay

Antivirals



- No known markers of resistance to FDA approved antiviral drugs (PA inhibitor: baloxavir; NA inhibitors: oseltamivir, peramivir, and zanamivir)
- Oseltamivir recommended for treatment and post-exposure prophylaxis

Candidate Vaccine Viruses (CVVs)




- H5N1 viruses (hemagglutinin gene) identified from the 3 human cases are very closely related to two available CVVs
- CVVs expected to provide good protection against clade 2.3.4.4b viruses

Surveillance, Human Monitoring, and Testing

- Since March 24, **>500 people monitored** from affected farms, **>45 tested**
- CDC monitoring multiple surveillance systems for unusual activity



No indicators of unusual influenza activity in people, including avian influenza A(H5N1)



Summer Influenza Surveillance Priorities

- Continued monitoring of workers with recent exposure on confirmed farms
- Facilitate detection of A(H5N1) in the community through enhanced, national surveillance at seasonal influenza levels
 - Subtyping of influenza A positive specimens, expanded specimen sources
 - Continued surveillance of lab-confirmed influenza associated hospitalizations through FluSurv-NET
- Continued follow-up for areas that flag in syndromic and wastewater data
- Provider outreach to continue influenza testing through summer, particularly for patients with recent history of relevant exposures

Opening Poll Question

In terms of level of concern with respect to the current outbreak of H5N1, I have:

- **Low concern** - continue to follow, no major changes recommended to preparedness activities.
- **Moderate concern** - following closely; planning some changes to preparedness activities.
- **High concern** - following very closely; planning and implementing major changes to preparedness activities.

Questions



Closing Poll Question

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Thank you!



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